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Using the microdata of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we evaluate whether U.S.
consumers form macroeconomic expectations consistent with different economic con-
cepts. We check whether their expectations are in line with the Phillips Curve, the
Taylor Rule and the Income Fisher Equation. We observe that 50% of the surveyed
population have expectations consistent with the Income Fisher equation and the
Taylor Rule, while 25% are in line with the Phillips Curve. However, only 6% of
consumers form theory-consistent expectations with respect to all three concepts.
For the Taylor Rule and the Phillips curve we observe a strong cyclical pattern. For
all three concepts we find significant differences across demographic groups. Evalu-
ating determinants of consistency, we provide evidence that the likelihood of having
theory-consistent expectations with respect to the Phillips curve and the Taylor
rule falls during recessions and with inflation higher than 2%. Moreover, consis-
tency with respect to all three concepts is affected by changes in the communication
policy of the Fed, where the strongest positive effect on consistency comes from the
introduction of the official inflation target. Finally, we show that consumers with
theory-consistent expectations have lower absolute inflation forecast errors and are
closer to professionals’ inflation forecasts.
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1 Introduction
Consumers’ expectations regarding macroeconomic variables are important for economic
decisions, such as the decision to purchase a house, the decision for a savings portfolio
or wage negotiations, but also for policy makers attempting to guide consumers’ expec-
tations. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how consumers form expectations about
key macroeconomic variables such as inflation, unemployment and interest rates. Specif-
ically, we focus on checking whether those expectations comove in a sensible way and
hence are in line with established economic concepts. This allows us to identify any pat-
terns in consumers’ behaviour that can potentially extend the scope for improvement of
communication strategies by central banks. Furthermore, we can also evaluate whether
changes in the communication strategies of the Federal Open Market Committee over
the last decades contributed to enhanced understanding of the monetary policy and the
comovements between key macroeconomic variables.
In this paper, we ask whether consumers form expectations consistent with core con-
cepts in macroeconomic theory. More specifically, we analyse consistency with an In-
come “Fisher” equation, the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule. We test if consumers’
expectations correctly distinguish between real and nominal expected income, implying
consistency with the Income Fisher equation. Testing the Phillips curve, we analyse if
consumers comprehend the short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment, or,
alternatively, the positive relation between inflation and the output gap. Finally, we evalu-
ate whether consumers are aware of the dual mandate of monetary policy regarding stable
prices and high employment and, hence, whether they form expectations regarding inter-
est rates, inflation and unemployment (or the output gap) in line with the Taylor rule.
Note that throughout the paper, the term “consistent expectations” denotes consistent
with an economic concept.
Our analysis is conducted utilising the microdata from the University of Michigan
Survey of Consumers (henceforth Michigan Survey), which since January 1978 comprises
monthly data of consumers’ expectations regarding core macroeconomic variables, but
also includes a wide range of socio-demographic characteristics.
We find that on average about 50% of consumers correctly distinguish between real
and nominal income expectations and form expectations in line with the Taylor rule.
The average share of consumers with expectations consistent with the Phillips curve is
significantly lower at about 25%. However, on average only 6% of consumers form theory-
consistent expectations with respect to all three concepts in a given period, implying that
economic literacy does not necessarily cover all economic concepts simultaneously. More-
over, we find that the degree of consistency of consumers varies both across demographic
groups and across time. Specifically, we show that women, as well as lower income and
education groups are significantly worse at forming consistent macroeconomic expecta-
tions, particularly with respect to the Income Fisher equation. Moreover, the shares of
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consumers consistent with the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule show a cyclical pattern
over time with pronounced drops in consistency during recession periods.
Evaluating the impact of macroeconomic determinants on the likelihood of eliciting
theory-consistent expectations, we provide evidence that consistency with respect to the
Phillips curve and the Taylor rule drops with rising inflation above the official inflation
target of 2%, while the effect is positive for consistency with the Income Fisher equation.
Moreover, consumers are significantly less likely to form expectations consistent with the
Phillips curve and the Taylor rule during recession periods. We further investigate the
effect of recession periods by studying the interaction effects with other macro variables.
We find that several macroeconomic variables exhibit asymmetric effects on consistency
over the business cycle.
Since the understanding of the macroeconomic relations evaluated may be affected
by the communication strategy of monetary policy, we additionally analyse the effect of
changes in the communication strategy of the Fed on the likelihood of consumers forming
consistent expectations. We find that communication measures had mostly positive effects
on consistency, with the highest number of effects on consistency with the Taylor rule. This
suggests that recent communication strategies contributed to increased understanding of
the monetary policy. The most important communication measures in terms of the size
of its effect and its significance for consistency with all three concepts under investigation
turns out to be the announcement of changes in its target for the federal funds rate in
February 1994 and the introduction of the official inflation target in January 2012.
Finally, we evaluate the forecast accuracy regarding future inflation of those consumers
who form expectations consistent with those three macroeconomic relations, and compare
their absolute forecast errors to those of the inconsistent sample of consumers in the
Michigan Survey, as well as to those from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
This part of our analysis relates to Ang et al. (2007) who compare the forecasting accuracy
for inflation of forecasts from ARIMA models, models of the Phillips curve, term structure
models and survey measures. We find that consumers with theory-consistent expectations
on average have lower absolute forecast errors regarding inflation compared to consumers
with non-consistent expectations. Moreover, they are on average closer to the absolute
forecast error of inflation forecasts from the SPF, except for the Fisher equation where
there are no significant differences, and more often beat the SPF forecast. Again, we find
some time-variation of these effects, suggesting that theory-consistency is particularly
related to an improvement in inflation forecasting abilities in the later part of our sample.
There are several studies our paper is related to. The paper by Carvalho and Nechio
(2012) is closely related to our analysis with respect to the Taylor rule. The authors study
consistency of expectations across demographic groups and in comparison to the Survey
of Professional Forecasters. We design a complementary exercise to study the Taylor
rule relationship, but extent their approach in various ways. Besides considering further
macroeconomic relations individually as well as jointly, we account for time variation, test
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for possible determinants of having consistent expectations and link consistency of expec-
tations to monetary policy communication and forecast accuracy. Another related paper
is Fendel et al. (2011) where the authors rely on the Consensus Economic Forecast poll for
the G-7 countries to estimate a Taylor rule relationship for professional forecasters. In-
terpreting the size of the estimated coefficients they conclude that professional forecasters
apply Taylor type rules for their forecasts.
Overall, the existing literature has focused mainly on the formation of consumers’ ex-
pectations on individual macroeconomic aggregates, measured from survey data, where
most approaches focus on consumers’ inflation expectations. Earlier studies such as Soule-
les (2004) and Mankiw et al. (2004) reject the rationality of U.S. consumers’ inflation
expectations and show that expectations are heterogeneous across demographic groups.
Subsequently, Branch (2004, 2007) as well as Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012)
test for expectation formation processes with limited information. In addition, Carroll
and Dunn (1997) as well as Curtin (2003) analyse the formation of U.S. consumers’ un-
employment expectations. They find a robust link between unemployment expectations
and consumption and show that unemployment expectations contain private information
measured by reported news heard on unemployment and by individual income expecta-
tions. More recently, Tortorice (2012) shows that consumers’ unemployment expectations,
like inflation expectations, are not formed rationally, but rather may be best explained
by an extrapolative forecasting rule. Finally, Baghestani and Kherfi (2008) evaluate U.S.
consumers’ interest rate expectations and show that consumers are more likely to predict
upwards than downwards movements if interest rates are relatively stable, interpreting
this result as evidence in favour of asymmetric loss functions.
Analysing theory-consistency, our paper also relates to the literature on macroeco-
nomic literacy, put forward by Blanchflower and Kelly (2008). The authors evaluate
macroeconomic literacy regarding inflation and unemployment by estimating the likeli-
hood for “don’t know” answers in UK survey microdata asking for inflation expectations
and satisfaction with the Bank of England. They find that illiteracy, i.e. the probability
of non-response, is significantly higher for women, the young or the old as well as low
education or low income groups. Moreover, respondents in the Eurobarometer Survey
for the UK from these groups more often reported that they did not know the official
rate of inflation. Generally, respondents who did report an estimate of the official infla-
tion rate frequently overestimated actual inflation. In an experimental study, Burke and
Manz (2011) moreover show that subjects with a higher economic literacy make a better
choice of the information to use for forecasting and better use the given information in an
inflation forecasting experiment.
Our paper also relates to the literature studying central bank communication practices.
Over the last decades central banks have attached a lot of attention to various communi-
cation strategies aimed at explaining monetary policy decisions and guiding expectations
of professional forecasters as well as expectations of consumers. While, as pointed out
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by Blinder et al. (2008), communication and transparency improves the effectiveness of
monetary policy, there is no consensus on what constitutes an optimal communication
strategy.1 Communication strategies of the Fed or more precisely of the Federal Open
Market Committee are studied in, e.g., Middeldorp (2011) and Carlson et al. (2006).2
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We describe our identification method
for expectations that are consistent with the Fisher Income equation, the Phillips curve
and the Taylor rule in detail in section 2. Section 3 offers a description of the dataset.
Our results are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2 Measuring the Consistency of Macroeconomic Ex-
pectations
We test the consistency of consumers’ macroeconomic expectations in the University of
Michigan Survey of Consumers by evaluating three core relations in macroeconomic the-
ory: The distinction between real and nominal values captured by an Income Fisher equa-
tion, the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule. Specifically, we check whether the formation
of macroeconomic expectations at the time of the interview is consistent with the pre-
diction of the macroeconomic concept being tested. Note that while the Fisher equation
is a theoretical concept which should always be satisfied by definition, both the Phillips
curve and the Taylor rule were initially derived as empirical regularities. Therefore, they
are in reality likely not to be satisfied every period and we expect a priori the shares
of consistency regarding the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule to be more responsive to
current macroeconomic conditions.
First, we test if individual consumers correctly perceive the distinction between real
and nominal values. This concept may be derived in the form of the Fisher equation,
which describes the relation between nominal and real interest rates. Assuming that a
bond earns a nominal return of it in the next period, its real return rt must be depreciated
with next period’s expected inflation πet :
rt ≈ it − πet . (1)
The Fisher equation thus gives the relation between real and nominal values and, hence,
provides a concept to test also for money illusion. Since the Michigan Survey does not
include any question about real interest rates, we apply the concept of the Fisher equation
to consumers’ real and nominal income expectations instead. We thus assume that since
income expectations concern households’ monetary income in the future, their real value
1See also Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007).
2Furthermore, it has been shown by for instance Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010) for the Fed or Sturm
and Haan (2011) for the ECB that communication can help predicting the future interest decision.
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should be depreciated with expected inflation similar to bonds’ returns in the Fisher
equation. We label this relation the “Income Fisher equation”:
rincet ≈ incet − πet , (2)
where rincet and inc
e
t denote consumers’ real and nominal income expectations, respec-
tively. The Michigan Survey asks consumers to provide quantitative estimates for both
expected inflation and expected nominal income in the next 12 months:
A15a “By about what percent do you expect your (family) income to (increase/decrease)
during the next 12 months?”
A12b “By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the average, during
the next 12 months?”
From these two measures, we construct the implied quantitative real income expectations
by subtracting individual inflation expectations from individual nominal income expecta-
tions. To evaluate the consistency of implied real income expectations, we compare the
quantitative estimate that would be consistent with the Income Fisher equation with the
qualitative answer to the survey question for real income expectations:
A14 “During the next year or two, do you expect that your (family) income will go up
more than prices will go up, about the same, or less than prices will go up?”
We define expectations as being consistent with the Income Fisher equation if the direction
of consumers’ qualitative real income expectations coincides with the sign of their implied
quantitative real income expectations. Hence, if consumers report “income goes up more
than prices”, they should report nominal price and income expectations which result in
positive real income expectations and vice versa. Note that a small caveat applies: The
horizon of the qualitative real income question includes the next 12 months as in the
quantitative questions, but also the year after that. Nevertheless, we argue that it is
unlikely that consumers expect such large variations in real income over two years, that
they might for instance have positive real income expectations over the next 12 months,
but expect a drop in their real income over the next 1-2 years.3
Next, we evaluate if consumers form their inflation and their output or unemployment
expectations in line with the Phillips curve relation. The original Phillips curve pro-
posed as an empirical relation by Phillips (1958) and Samuelson and Solow (1960) asserts
a negative correlation between wage growth, or the general inflation rate πt (assuming
that prices grow in line with wages, adjusted for productivity growth), and the rate of
unemployment ut:
3Note that this argument is consistent with the law of iterated expectations.
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Although the Phillips curve may be non-linear, with a smaller slope at low inflation rates,
the trade-off between inflation and unemployment is generally assumed to hold at least
in the short run. Note that we define the trade-off to be satisfied also if both inflation
and unemployment stay constant. Via Okun’s law, this may be translated into a positive
correlation between inflation and output yt:




Modern macroeconomic models generally derive the Phillips curve as an aggregate supply
relation with forward-looking firms setting prices under monopolistic competition and
subject to sticky prices. This results in the so-called New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(Clarida et al., 1999):
πt = κEtπt+1 + λŷt + εt, (5)
where inflation is a function of expected inflation Etπt+1 and the output gap ŷt, and εt
may be interpreted as a cost-push shock. Under the New Keynesian Phillips curve, we
should thus also observe a positive correlation between inflation and the output gap, with
its strength given by the coefficient λ.4
For our analysis of consumers’ expectations, we concentrate on the short-run relation
between inflation and the unemployment rate, or between inflation and business condi-
tions, which we take as a proxy for the output gap. For all three variables, the Michigan
survey includes qualitative questions asking for consumers’ expectations over the next 12
months:
A7 “How about a year from now, do you expect that in the country as a whole business
conditions will be better, or worse than they are present, or just about the same?”
A10 “How about people out of work during the coming 12 months – do you think that
there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?”
A12 “During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go up, (go up
at the same rate), go down, or stay where they are now?”
We thus define consumers’ expectations as being consistent with the Phillips curve if
consumers expect prices to increase and unemployment to decrease or business conditions
4There is a possibility that the Phillips curve relationship is muted in real data due to the presence
of various shocks. As Carlstrom and Fuerst (2008) point out, especially mark-up shocks might be prob-
lematic as they could lead to effects on output and inflation that are not consistent with the short-run
Phillips curve correlations. However, under the assumption that shock are not observed, the expectations
of the public should still be aligned with the Phillips curve relationship.
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to improve and vice versa. Similarly, expectations are consistent when consumers expect
unemployment or business conditions to stay the same and also expect prices or inflation
to stay constant. Note that the wording of the qualitative question regarding inflation
expectations asks for expectations regarding price changes, rather than the inflation rate.
We thus interpret the answer “go up at the same rate”, which is offered in a clarifying
question only if consumers answer “stay the same”, as constant inflation expectations by
the consumer and code it together with “stay the same”, i.e. zero inflation. We proceed in
the same way for our definition of expectations consistent with the Taylor rule explained
below.5
Finally, we analyse whether consumers form interest rate expectations in line with the
Taylor rule, that is whether they are aware of the dual mandate of the Fed regarding
price stability and high employment. The Taylor rule was formalized from empirical
observations of the Fed’s monetary policy by Taylor (1993) and states that the central
bank adjusts nominal short-run interest rates it in response to both deviations of inflation
from the target level (πt − π∗) and the output gap ŷt. The general Taylor rule, widely
used in modern macroeconomics to describe monetary policy actions, thus takes on the
following form:
it = γ + α(πt − π∗) + βŷt with α > 1, β > 0 (6)
We again measure consumers’ inflation expectations with the qualitative question [A12]
and use either the expectations regarding unemployment (where we expect a reversed
sign) in [A10] or regarding business conditions in [A7] as our proxy for the output gap.
Finally, the Michigan Survey includes a qualitative question on nominal interest rates,
which reads as follows:
5We checked for robustness of our results if the “prices go up at the same rate” category is counted as
positive inflation expectations together with “go up” and found that results did not change qualitatively.
Note that the qualitative inflation question in [A12] is potentially problematic since the question is phrased
in terms of prices, rather than in terms of the inflation rate. Therefore, we checked for the robustness
of our definitions of consistency if qualitative inflation questions are coded together with the consumers’
quantitative inflation expectations in question [A12b], which asks for a point estimate of the expected
inflation rate in percent. Figure A.1 in the appendix shows the shares of consumers consistent with the
Phillips curve and the Taylor rule for alternative definitions of qualitative inflation expectations. Shares
denoted with combined condition on the difference of individuals’ quantitative inflation expectations to
last month’s actual inflation (rounded to the nearest integer), and only code expectations as “increase”
if an individual answered “go up” in question [A12] and expected higher quantitative inflation than last
period’s inflation rate (and vice versa for “stay the same” and “decrease”). Shares denoted with consdiff
condition on individuals within the rotating panel dimension and additionally uses the difference in
quantitative inflation expectations between interviews. Hence, qualitative expectations will only be coded
as“increase”if the consumers answers“go up”in the second interview and has higher quantitative inflation
expectations than in the first interview. Obviously, both robustness checks imply a loss of observations.
Nevertheless, the consistency shares shown in Figure A.1 suggest that our initial definition is relatively
robust to these more conservative definitions, as the shares have very similar patterns.
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A11 “No one can say for sure, but what do you think will happen to interest rates for
borrowing money during the next 12 months – will they go up, stay the same, or go
down?”
We thus code consumers’ expectations as being in line with the Taylor rule if respon-
dents report that they expect rising interest rates, as well as increasing prices and falling
unemployment (better business conditions). Furthermore, interest rate expectations are
also consistent with the Taylor rule if consumers expect rising interest rates with either
rising price expectations or falling unemployment (better business conditions) expecta-
tions, while the other variable is expected to remain constant. The same rules apply
to expectations regarding falling interest rate expectations. Finally, if interest rates are
expected to remain constant, both prices and unemployment (business conditions) must
also be expected to stay the same.6
To simplify the discussion, in the paper we present only results regarding consistency
with the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule defined with unemployment expectations, and
as a robustness check show some results of probit models that take into account poten-
tial sample selection issues with expectations on business conditions in Table A.5 (second
columns) in the appendix. Generally, results differ little between specifications with un-
employment or business expectations. Additionally, since the Michigan Survey includes a
rotating panel dimension where a fraction of consumers is re-interviewed after six months,
consistency with both the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule can also be analysed with
respect to individual changes in expectations. Under this definition, we define expecta-
tions as being consistent if the direction of changes match the macroeconomic relation.
For instance, if a consumer has lower unemployment expectations in the second interview
compared to the first, she should also have increased her inflation expectations and vice
versa. Again, we show some results for consistency of differences in expectations in the
robustness analysis in Table A.5 (third columns) in the appendix. Here, the sign of the
marginal effects is often reversed in both the models for consistency with the Phillips
curve and with the Taylor rule.
3 Data
For our analysis, we use the microdata of the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.
The survey collects monthly data since January 1978 on consumers’ macroeconomic ex-
pectations, personal income expectations, purchasing attitudes, perceived economic news,
wealth position as well as demographic characteristics. Each monthly cross-section is
6As Carvalho and Nechio (2012) point out, there is a potential endogeneity and causality problem
when discussing the relationship among these forecasts. Households’ expectations might not reveal the
causal effect of inflation and unemployment on interest rates as there exists a potential endogeneity due
to monetary policy shocks (i.e. departures from systematic interest rate policy). However, Carvalho and
Nechio (2012) show that monetary policy shocks account only for a very small fraction of the variability
in inflation and the output gap in the US.
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chosen as a representative sample of the U.S. population. Additionally, about 40% of
each monthly sample are chosen to be re-interviewed after six months, so that the survey
contains a rotating panel dimension. We employ the full available sample period from
January 1978 to September 2012 and include the whole cross-section in our analysis.7
In addition to the survey questions on consumers’ expectations reviewed in the previous
section, we use a number of variables from the Michigan Survey as explanatory and control
variables. These contain personal demographic characteristics and their interaction terms,
where we include the consumer’s sex, age, race, marital status, number of children, region
as well as education and income groups. While household income is grouped into quintiles,
the education groups are defined as follows: educ1 – “Grade 0-8, no high school diploma”,
educ2 – “Grade 9-12, no high school diploma”, educ3 – “Grade 0-12, with high school
diploma”, educ4 – “4 yrs. of college, no degree”, educ5 – “3 yrs. of college, with degree”
and educ6 – “4 yrs. of college, with degree”. For the analysis of consistency across
demographic groups, we further define the following age groups: age young – 18-34, age
medium – 35-54 and age old – 55-97.
In addition to the microdata from the Michigan survey, a number of macroeconomic
variables are included as explanatory variables in the analysis. These include the CPI infla-
tion rate (π) and its volatility (σ2π) measured as the sum of squared inflation changes over
the previous six months. Moreover, we include data on the civilian unemployment rate (u),
the growth rate of the money stock M2 (m2growth), the Federal Funds rate (funds rate),
year-on-year oil price growth (oil) as well as a dummy variable nber recession which in-
dicates whether the current month is classified as a recession by the NBER. All macroe-
conomic data is obtained from the FRED database of the St. Louis Federal Reserve.
Additionally, we aim at evaluating the effects of changes in the monetary policy com-
munication strategy on consumers’ ability to form consistent macroeconomic expecta-
tions. Therefore, we construct dummy variables representing important milestones on
the path to more communication and greater transparency. In particular, we control
for the introduction of the Beige Book first published in June 1983 (BeigeBook83t),
the announcement of changes in its target for the federal funds rate in February 1994
(FFTargetAnnouncement94t), the practice of issuing a“balance of risks”statement along
with the policy decision in January 2000 (BalanceofRisk00t), the inclusion of votes with
name(s) of dissenters in the statement in March 2002 (V otes02t), providing forward guid-
ance by explicitly indicating the likely direction of rates over an extended period in August
2003 (ForwardGuidance03t), adding the Chairman’s press conference to the release of
projections in April 2011 (PressConference11t) and finally including an explicit inflation
target of 2% in January 2012 (ExplicitTarget12t).
Finally, we use data on professionals’ inflation expectations from the SPF in order
to compare the forecasting accuracy of consistent consumers with that of professional
7For further details on the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers, see
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu.
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forecasters. The SPF contains, inter alia, quarterly forecasts on inflation over the next
12 months (πe,1yrprof ), where one-year-ahead forecasts are available since 1981q3.
4 Results
4.1 Consistency of Expectations over Time and Across Demo-
graphic Groups
In this section, we present and discuss how many consumers form expectations in line
with the three mentioned economic concepts (i.e., Income Fisher equation, Phillips curve
and Taylor rule). First, we show how the share of consumers with consistent expectations
varies across the three economic concepts as well as across sociodemographic groups, where
we compare shares between males and females, across age and education groups as well
as income quintiles. Note that the unconditional probability of forming theory-consistent
expectations in the Michigan Survey is one third for the Income Fisher equation and
the Phillips Curve, while it is 25.9% for the Taylor rule. Additionally, the unconditional
probability of being consistent with all three principles is 2.88%. For all three relations in-
dividually as well as taken together, we find that the overall share of consistent consumers
is significantly different from the unconditional probability, see Tables 1-4. Second, we
check if the share of consumers with consistent expectations changes over time. If we
find support for the latter, it will make sense to check for possible determinants that may
affect the degree of consistency.
The following tables show how many individuals, relative to the overall sample, behave
in line with accredited economic concepts. Regarding the Income Fisher equation, see Ta-
ble 1, we conclude that roughly 51% of the surveyed population have theory-consistent
expectations. When looking at the sociodemographic characteristics, it seems that men
are more consistent than women. Moreover, the propensity to behave in line with the
Income Fisher equation rises with education, income, and age. According to t-tests for
equality of means and Kruskal-Wallis rank tests for equality of population, in all so-
ciodemographic groups both the mean and the median are significantly different from the
remaining sample.8
With regard to the Phillips curve (Table 2), on average a lower share of households
(26%) forms their expectations in line with this economic relationship than with the
Income Fisher equation. While for the Income Fisher equation we could report substan-
tial variation across educational groups, the shares forming expectations in line with the
Phillips Curve seem to be relatively homogeneously distributed across all educational
8We also apply Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank tests to test for significant differences in
medians within the demographic groups, i.e. within age, education and income groups, for the shares
shown in Tables 1-4. In all cases, except for the age groups of consistency with the Taylor rule, we find
that the medians differ significantly also within groups. Test results are available from the authors upon
request.
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Table 1: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations Regarding the Income Fisher
Equation
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
All 0.51 0.51 0.04 0.41 0.64 223,143 97.23*** –
Male 0.54 0.54 0.04 0.40 0.67 99,539 -20.23*** 306.08***
Female 0.49 0.49 0.04 0.37 0.64 123,237 20.22*** 305.70***
Age young 0.48 0.49 0.05 0.26 0.61 65,133 15.71*** 184.81***
Age medium 0.52 0.52 0.04 0.41 0.66 83,472 -3.61*** 9.73***
Age old 0.53 0.53 0.06 0.37 0.69 73,283 -11.84*** 104.94***
Educ1 0.47 0.47 0.13 0.00 1.00 9,896 7.11*** 37.88***
Educ2 0.47 0.47 0.10 0.13 0.85 15,703 10.06*** 75.83***
Educ3 0.47 0.47 0.05 0.34 0.73 68,603 22.16*** 367.03***
Educ4 0.51 0.51 0.06 0.33 0.68 53,007 1.43 1.52
Educ5 0.54 0.54 0.06 0.36 0.72 44,962 -13.62*** 138.98***
Educ6 0.59 0.58 0.06 0.41 0.81 28,672 -25.43*** 483.07***
Inc quint1 0.50 0.50 0.07 0.24 0.75 32,181 5.34*** 21.37***
Inc quint2 0.50 0.50 0.07 0.28 0.72 37,637 4.09*** 12.51***
Inc quint3 0.50 0.50 0.06 0.31 0.72 39,113 3.71*** 10.31***
Inc quint4 0.50 0.50 0.06 0.36 0.73 47,219 4.35*** 14.18**
Inc quint5 0.54 0.54 0.05 0.37 0.71 49,124 -15.34*** 176.07***
Notes: The last two columns represent (except the first row- All) tests for equality of means
(medians) between a particular subsample indicated in the first column and the rest of the sample.
For the mean we employ a two-sample mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and for the
median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. In the first row we test whether the
mean is different from the unconditional probability of having theory-consistent expectations in the
Michigan Survey (0.33) with a one-sample t-test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10%
level.
groups. Otherwise the patterns are very similar. In most cases the sub-groups are sig-
nificantly different from the rest of the sample. The rather low variation across sociode-
mographic groups together with the substantial gap between minimum and maximum
values already suggest a remarkable time variation. We will dwell on this issue by visual
inspection and by an economometric analysis at a later point. Both will support this
conjecture.
With respect to the Taylor rule (Table 3) we find the share of consumers that ad-
just their expectations in line with the Taylor rule concept to be similar to the share of
consumers consistent with the Income Fisher equation. Roughly one-half of the popula-
tion form consistent expectations. Similar to the results for the Phillips curve, we find
only little, but nevertheless often significant, variation across socioeconomic characteris-
tics and substantial variation over time. Hence, time-variant factors also seem to play an
important role here.
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Table 2: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations Regarding the Phillips Curve
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
All 0.26 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.41 238,396 -85.38*** –
Male 0.27 0.28 0.08 0.07 0.47 106,349 -13.46*** 103.40***
Female 0.25 0.25 0.06 0.07 0.39 131,542 13.19*** 99.37***
Age young 0.26 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.48 71,453 -4.75*** 12.85***
Age medium 0.25 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.48 88,146 6.80*** 26.43***
Age old 0.26 0.27 0.07 0.08 0.44 77,329 -2.62*** 3.90**
Educ1 0.27 0.26 0.10 0.00 0.60 11,042 -3.52*** 7.13***
Educ2 0.24 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.55 17,527 4.83*** 13.37***
Educ3 0.25 0.25 0.07 0.05 0.43 73,949 7.11*** 29.00***
Educ4 0.25 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.46 56,170 0.97 0.53
Educ5 0.27 0.28 0.08 0.02 0.48 46,924 -7.62*** 33.24***
Educ6 0.26 0.27 0.10 0.03 0.55 30,038 -3.58*** 7.37***
Inc quint1 0.25 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.48 32,552 4.88*** 13.88***
Inc quint2 0.25 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.45 38,675 7.58*** 33.47***
Inc quint3 0.26 0.26 0.07 0.03 0.50 39,847 3.48*** 7.04***
Inc quint4 0.27 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.47 48,349 -2.23** 2.90*
Inc quint5 0.28 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.51 50,470 -11.91*** 82.65***
Notes: The last two columns represent (except the first row- All) tests for equality of means
(medians) between a particular subsample indicated in the first column and the rest of the sample.
For the mean we employ a two-sample mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and for the
median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. In the first row we test whether the
mean is different from the unconditional probability of having theory-consistent expectations in the
Michigan Survey (0.33) with a one-sample t-test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10%
level.
Finally, we present the summary statistics for the share of people that form consistent
estimates for all three economic concepts simultaneously at a time. Results are presented
in Table 4. Only 6% of the surveyed population have expectations that are in line with
all three concepts. This is significantly below the average of the individual tables and
indicates that if people have reacted for instance appropriately with regard to the Taylor
rule, this does not necessarily imply that they will form expectations in line with the
other economic concepts. Nevertheless, this still seems to increase the likelihood of be-
ing consistent with all three relations as we find that 6% is significantly higher than the
unconditional probability of 2.9%. Again, we find rather little variation across sociodemo-
graphic characteristics, but increased variation over time. This result thus also supports
the presumption that the degree of consistency is time-varying and may be linked and
tested with regard to a set of possible macroeconomic determinants.
The substantial time variation indicated by the previous tables calls for a deeper
investigation of this issue. Consequently, we plot the calculated shares over time. Figure
1 shows the shares of consistent expectations for all three economic concepts individually
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Table 3: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations Regarding the Taylor Rule
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
All 0.51 0.52 0.09 0.25 0.67 238,396 43.44*** –
Male 0.50 0.51 0.10 0.20 0.72 106,349 5.22*** 20.47***
Female 0.51 0.52 0.08 0.25 0.68 131,542 -5.29*** 20.96***
Age young 0.51 0.52 0.09 0.23 0.72 71,453 -0.03 -0.02
Age middle 0.50 0.52 0.10 0.19 0.71 88,146 0.96 0.72
Age old 0.51 0.52 0.10 0.27 0.69 77,329 -1.07 0.90
Educ1 0.47 0.47 0.12 0.14 1.00 11,042 7.18*** 38.61***
Educ2 0.47 0.46 0.11 0.15 0.86 17,527 10.55*** 83.53***
Educ3 0.50 0.52 0.09 0.27 0.69 73,949 1.72* 2.26
Educ4 0.51 0.52 0.09 0.20 0.74 56,170 -1.21 1.13
Educ5 0.52 0.54 0.11 0.17 0.78 46,924 -7.63*** 43.65***
Educ6 0.52 0.54 0.13 0.14 0.81 30,038 -4.16*** 12.97***
Inc quint1 0.47 0.48 0.09 0.17 0.71 32,552 11.98*** 107.52***
Inc quint2 0.50 0.51 0.09 0.23 0.71 38,675 3.57*** 9.54***
Inc quint3 0.51 0.52 0.10 0.25 0.75 39,847 -4.29*** 13.83***
Inc quint4 0.51 0.52 0.10 0.21 0.83 48,349 -1.92** 2.75*
Inc quint5 0.52 0.53 0.12 0.20 0.79 50,470 -7.27*** 39.57***
Notes: The last two columns represent (except the first row- All) tests for equality of means
(medians) between a particular subsample indicated in the first column and the rest of the sample.
For the mean we employ a two-sample mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and for the
median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. In the first row we test whether the
mean is different from the unconditional probability of having theory-consistent expectations in the
Michigan Survey (0.26) with a one-sample t-test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10%
level.
as well as the share of consistent expectations satisfying all three economic concepts
simultaneously.
Regarding the Income Fisher equation, we observe, as indicated by the tables, rather
little time variation. This is in line with our presumption that the distinction between real
and nominal income should be less dependent on changes in macroeconomic conditions
than the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule which may not always be satisfied in reality.9
Nevertheless, over the last ten years the consistency of the public with respect to the
Income Fisher equation seems to follow an upwards trend, thus consumers become more
able to form nominal income and inflation expectations in line with their real income
expectations. This might be due to very low and stable inflation rates in the recent years.
9Figure A.2 in the appendix depicts the shares of consumers consistent with the Phillips curve and
the Taylor rule together with the periods when the Phillips curve trade-off and the Taylor rule concept
where realised in actual data 12 months ahead, rounded to the nearest integer. It seems that both were
realised in the majority of periods in our sample. However, there are pronounced gaps at the beginning
of the sample period, when the U.S. economy was hit by stagflation and monetary policy was less active.
This could provide an explanation of the low consistency shares observed during this period.
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Table 4: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations for All Three Economic
Concepts
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
All 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.15 223,143 29.13*** –
Male 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.19 99,539 -11.16*** 21.24***
Female 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.13 123,237 11.10*** 21.04***
Age young 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.23 65,133 2.83*** 1.36
Age middle 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.15 83,472 2.46** 1.02
Age old 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.18 73,283 -5.40*** 4.99**
Educ1 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.67 9,896 -0.90 0.13
Educ2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.21 15,703 4.12*** 2.86*
Educ3 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.16 68,603 10.64*** 19.30***
Educ4 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.22 53,007 1.71* 0.48
Educ5 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.20 44,962 -7.60*** 9.82***
Educ6 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.20 28,672 -9.57*** 15.63***
Inc quint1 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.19 32,181 2.22** 0.82
Inc quint2 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.16 37,637 5.91*** 5.93**
Inc quint3 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.15 39,113 2.79*** 1.26
Inc quint4 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.17 47,219 2.30** 0.88
Inc quint5 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.24 49,124 -11.63*** 23.08***
Notes: The last two columns represent (except the first row- All) tests for equality of means
(medians) between a particular subsample indicated in the first column and the rest of the sample.
For the mean we employ a two-sample mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and for the
median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. In the first row we test whether the
mean is different from the unconditional probability of having theory-consistent expectations in the
Michigan Survey (0.029) with a one-sample t-test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10%
level.
With respect to the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule, the consistency shares show
much more time variation with a pronounced cyclical pattern. Recession periods denoted
by the NBER, indicated by the shaded areas, seem to impair the ability to form consistent
expectations as they correspond with downward dips in the consistency shares. Looking
at the Taylor rule share specifically, we can report that people can forecast rising and
constant interest rates more accurately than falling interest rates. Within a tightening
cycle the expectations become more in line with the Taylor rule concept. The same
holds true for unchanged interest rates. This asymmetric response is not surprising as it
may stem from people being unable to forecast recessions are having problems absorbing
negative news or policy reversals.
Finally, we further find some variation over time of the share of consumers consistent
with all three macroeconomic relations, albeit at a very low level. Again, we observe small
dips during recession periods.
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Note: Graphs present the shares of consumers with consistent expectations, together with a polynomial
trend. Shaded areas denote recession periods as defined by the NBER.
While we have shown that the shares of consistent consumers vary over time and
across demographic groups, it is also interesting to check if consumers stay consistent
between the first and the second interview of the rotating panel. Overall, between 50-60%
of consumers are either consistent or inconsistent in both interviews, where this result
holds for all three concepts evaluated. Moreover, being consistent in the first interview
increases the likelihood of consistency in the second interview by about 15-16% for a
representative consumer as defined below, with a highly significant effect.10 Indeed, the
shares of consistent consumers increase in the second interview, implying some learning
effect between the first and the second interview.
Furthermore, we are interested in elaborating the reasons why expectations are not
consistent with the economic concepts. Hence, before we turn to a more rigorous econo-
metric approach, we introduce cross tabulations of the underlying expectations in Tables
A.1-A.4 in the Appendix. Looking at the Income Fisher relationship in Table A.1, we
observe that there are more inconsistent households that have negative real income ex-
pectations, but at the same time expect higher growth in nominal income than in prices,
10Estimation results from heckprobit models controlling for demographic factors are available from the
authors upon request.
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than vice versa. Table A.2 indicates that the reason why households produce forecasts
that are not consistent with the Phillips curve is that those households that report prices
to go up, do not expect unemployment to go down. In fact, more than 85% of households
who expect inflation to go up, predict the unemployment rate to stay about the same
or to be higher in the next year. Dissecting the Taylor rule relationship in Tables A.3
and A.4 implies that households get the relationship between inflation and interest rates
quite right, but have more problems with the relation between unemployment and inter-
est rates. There exist only weak links between expecting higher rates of unemployment
and falling interest rates.11 This is quite an interesting result. The Fed is known to put
significant weight on unemployment rates and economic growth relative to inflation as
compared for instance to the ECB. Therefore, it is remarkable that consumers in the U.S.
have still difficulties in understanding this relationship for a central bank that is as active
in regarding stabilizing unemployment as the Fed is.
Overall, this section provides some very interesting insights. Looking at consistency,
we find that half of the surveyed U.S. population holds beliefs in line with the Taylor
rule and the Income Fisher equation. Expectations consistent with the Phillips curve are
observed only in 25% of cases. For concsistency with respect to the Phillips curve and the
Taylor rule, we find more time-variation than cross-sectional variation, while the reverse is
true for consistency with the Income Fisher equation. The observed time-variation seems
to be linked to macroeconomic fundamentals as we observe strong patterns with respect
to recessions, where the share of consistent answers drops dramatically.
4.2 Determinants of Consistency
In this section, we analyse possible macroeconomic determinants for the formation of con-
sistent expectations and check for effects of monetary policy communication. Specifically,
we evaluate effects of macroeconomic conditions like inflation, unemployment, money
growth, short-run interest rates or the effect of being in a recession. After the benchmark
estimation, we evaluate the inflation effect on consistency in more detail by distinguish-
ing between inflation above and below the official target of 2%. Next, we check whether
macroeconomic effects differ between boom and recession periods. Finally, we analyse how
changes in the communication strategy of the Federal Reserve have affected consumers’
consistency with macroeconomic concepts. All macroeconomic variables are included with
one lag in order to account for a possible publication lag.
We estimate probit models on the probability of forming theory-consistent expectations
regarding the Income Fisher equation, the Phillips curve, the Taylor rule as well as all
three macroeconomic relations simultaneously. Tables 5-8 report marginal effects for our
set of determinants. In order to enable comparability across models, all marginal effects
are evaluated at a hypothetical “representative” consumer which we take to be male,
11This result is in line with Carvalho and Nechio (2012).
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white, 40 years old, married, with a medium level of education and income and living
in the Northcentral region of the U.S. All models additionally include a wide range of
demographic controls including interaction terms.
We thus specify a binary response model. The following variable is defined:
zi,t =
{
1 if z∗i,t > 0
0 if z∗i,t ≤ 0
, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (7)
where z∗i,t is the latent variable that accounts for consumers’ theory-consistent expecta-
tions. Its discrete counterpart, zi,t, takes value one if the i
th respondent formed theory-
consistent expectations in period t, and zero otherwise. The following latent process is
assumed:
z∗i,t = α1 + ytα2 + xi,tα3 + ui,t, (8)
where α1 is a constant, yt is the vector of macroeconomic variables, xi,t is a vector of
socio-demographic characteristics (namely gender, age, income, education, race, marital
status, location in the US and interaction terms between gender and education, race and
region, as well as income and marital status) and ui,t is normally distributed. We derive
the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(zi,t= 1|hi,t) = Φ (hi,tξ), where Φ(·)
is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, hi,t is the vector of covariates and ξ is a
vector of coefficients.
Since our dataset contains single survey interviews as well as interviews within the
rotating panel, estimations on the full dataset may lead to biased estimates due to a
sample selection problem. Moreover, additional sample selection might arise from non-
response bias, which might be higher for specific demographic groups.12 We therefore
account for possible attrition both with respect to non-response and with respect to being
selected into the rotating panel and estimate all models with a Heckman correction. Our
selection variable thus takes on the value of one for second interviews within the rotating
panel, conditional on response to the question on quantitative inflation expectations.13
Sample selection will only bias the estimates if the error terms of the outcome and of the
selection equation are significantly correlated as measured by the parameter ρ. Overall,
sample selection seems to have relatively small effects in our models since a Wald test
frequently cannot reject ρ = 0.
The marginal effects from the Heckman probit models in Table 5 imply that U.S. con-
sumers are less likely to form theory-consistent macroeconomic expectations with respect
12Specifically, we evaluate non-response to the question on quantitative inflation expectations. We
argue that this question might be perceived as being more demanding than the qualitative questions and,
thus, more prone to non-response.
13Note that our Heckman probit estimates thus effectively account for only second interviews within
the rotating panel.
17
to the Taylor rule in periods with high inflation.14 Additionally, we find a positive effect of
inflation volatility on consistency with the Phillips curve and with all concepts simultane-
ously, which could be linked to an increase in attention towards macroeconomic variables
in these periods. Interestingly, inflation volatility has a negative impact on consistency
with the Income Fisher equation. Higher unemployment or a higher Federal Fund rate also
significantly reduce the likelihood of consistent expectations regarding the Income Fisher
equation and the Taylor rule. Moreover, consumers show significantly lower degrees of
consistency with the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule in recession periods, while we find
no significant business-cycle-effect on consistency with the Income Fisher equation. This
result is as expected, considering the low time-variation in the share of consistent con-
sumers regarding the Income Fisher equation compared to consistency shares regarding
the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule.
Table 5: Macro Determinants of Consistency
Income Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Three
πt−1 0.0052 -0.0039 -0.0140*** 0.0023
(0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0030)
σ2π,t−1 -0.0050*** 0.0064*** 0.0027 0.0026*
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0013)
oilt−1 0.0002* -0.0003** -0.0001 -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ut−1 -0.0215*** 0.0165* -0.0242*** -0.0010
(0.0078) (0.0098) (0.0085) (0.0070)
m2growtht−1 0.0002 -0.0048** -0.0013 -0.0038**
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0018)
funds ratet−1 -0.0107** -0.0060 -0.0155*** -0.0072
(0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0052) (0.0050)
nber recessiont 0.0046 -0.0338*** -0.0472*** 0.0108
(0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0104)
N 93763 95893 95389 93109
χ2 848.684 1127.469 1108.565 467.516
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.736 -0.290 -0.321 -0.376
Wald test (ρ=0, χ2) 11.12*** 1.32 2.57 1.44
Notes: Table 5 reports the marginal partial effects from the heckprobit models evaluated at the
representative consumer. The Wald test for ρ = 0 gives the χ2 statistics of the Wald test for
independence from the sample selection equation. Standard errors are calculated with the δ method
(Oehlert 1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
14We show some results for consistency when the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule are specified with
business cycle expectations instead of unemployment expectations and when we evaluate the consistency
of individual differences in expectations in the robustness analysis in Table A.5 in the appendix. The
results remain broadly consistent when using business cycle expectations. However, the sign of the
marginal effects is often reversed in the models for consistency of differences in expectations.
18
Table 6: Inflation Effects Above and Below 2% on Consistency
Income Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Three
dummy π below2t−1 0.0247** -0.0838*** -0.0444*** -0.0159
(0.0116) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0103)
πt−1 0.0127*** -0.0298*** -0.0170*** -0.0039
(0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0026)
πt−1 ∗ dummy π below2t−1 -0.0080 0.0440*** 0.0182*** 0.0146***
(0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0053)
σ2π,t−1 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0043* 0.0015
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0017)
σ2π,t−1 ∗ dummy π below2t−1 -0.0009 -0.0022 0.0065** -0.0016
(0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0023)
oilt−1 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.0004*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ut−1 0.0072*** 0.0179*** -0.0012 0.0048**
(0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0019)
m2growtht−1 0.0026*** 0.0033*** 0.0023*** 0.0015
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0011)
funds ratet−1 -0.0086*** 0.0046** -0.0058*** -0.0042
(0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0027)
nber recessiont 0.0032 -0.0565*** -0.1159*** -0.0324***
(0.0085) (0.0114) (0.0166) (0.0070)
N 93763 95893 95389 93109
χ2 649.422 913.08 680.389 355.887
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.814 -0.302 -0.407 -0.508
Wald test (ρ=0, χ2) 12.95*** 1.10 3.46* 2.01
Notes: Table 6 reports the marginal partial effects from the heckprobit models evaluated at the repre-
sentative consumer. The Wald test for ρ = 0 gives the χ2 statistics of the Wald test for independence
from the sample selection equation. Standard errors are calculated with the δ method (Oehlert 1992)
and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
Next, we evaluate the nature of the inflation effect on consistency in more detail. In
Table 6 we check whether inflation effects on consistency differ between periods with infla-
tion above or below the official target of 2%. Interestingly, this gives a positive marginal
effect of inflation rates on consistency with the Income Fisher equation, while the inflation
volatility effect becomes insignificant. By contrast, consistency with the Phillips curve and
the Taylor rule, and to some extent also consistency with all relations, is negatively af-
fected by inflation at rates above 2%: At high inflation rates, consumers are increasingly
unsure about the inflation-unemployment trade-off and the appropriate monetary policy
reaction. Additionally, we find a positive inflation effect at rates below 2%, suggesting
that consumers also have problems with correctly identifying the macroeconomic rela-
tions under consideration when inflation is below the target. Interestingly, the marginal
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Table 7: Recession Interaction Effects on Consistency
Income Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Three
πt−1 0.0127*** -0.0171*** -0.0096*** -0.0014
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0016)
πt−1 ∗ nber recessiont -0.0065 0.0411*** 0.0159 0.0139*
(0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0079)
σ2π,t−1 0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0072*** -0.0003
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0014)
σ2π,t−1 ∗ nber recessiont -0.0047 -0.0049 0.0054 0.0024
(0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0025)
oilt−1 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0006*** 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
oilt−1 ∗ nber recessiont 0.0009*** -0.0022*** -0.0015*** -0.0004**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
ut−1 0.0069*** 0.0156*** -0.0028** 0.0029***
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0009)
ut−1 ∗ nber recessiont 0.0095 -0.0039 0.0139* 0.0070
(0.0080) (0.0085) (0.0079) (0.0053)
m2growtht−1 0.0007 0.0038*** 0.0015* 0.0013**
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006)
m2growtht−1 ∗ nber recessiont 0.0113 -0.0068 0.0233** 0.0080
(0.0097) (0.0102) (0.0095) (0.0064)
funds ratet−1 -0.0041*** 0.0032** -0.0040*** -0.0031***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0010)
funds ratet−1 ∗ nber recessiont 0.0036 -0.0152*** 0.0132*** 0.0031
(0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0035)
nber recessiont -0.1517 -0.0620 -0.4810*** -0.1971
(0.1317) (0.1427) (0.1300) (0.0889)
N 93763 95893 95389 93109
χ2 609.24 861.226 778.205 289.099
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.019 -0.336 0.026 -0.265
Wald test (ρ=0, χ2) 0.06 14.35*** 0.06 6.49**
Notes: Table 7 reports the marginal partial effects from the heckprobit models evaluated at the represen-
tative consumer. The Wald test for ρ = 0 gives the χ2 statistics of the Wald test for independence from
the sample selection equation. Standard errors are calculated with the δ method (Oehlert 1992) and are
reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
effects of inflation volatility mostly become insignificant when we account for asymmetric
inflation effects below and above 2%.
In a next step, we interact the recession dummy with the other macroeconomic de-
terminants in Table 7 in order to evaluate whether these macro effects differ over the
business cycle. Throughout all three macroeconomic concepts analysed, macroeconomic
determinants have significantly different effects between boom and recession periods. In
line with our results in Table 6, we find that inflation increases the likelihood for con-
20
sumers to form expectations consistent with the Phillips curve during recessions (when
inflation rates typically fall). Interestingly, our results suggest that the effect of oil price
increases moves in the opposite direction to the inflation effect: Higher oil prices sig-
nificantly increase the likelihood of consistency with the Income Fisher equation during
recessions, while they have a detrimental effect on consistency with the Phillips curve or
the Taylor rule. This can be explained with rather strong oil price hikes during some of
the recessions in our sample period, especially during the oil price shocks of 1980 and
1990-91 and at the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. The Federal Funds rate also
affects consistency with respect to the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule differently during
recessions, albeit in opposite directions: Restrictive monetary policy makes it harder for
consumers to form expectations consistent with the Phillips curve trade-off, but increases
the likelihood of expectations consistent with the Taylor rule. Finally, both the marginal
effects of the unemployment rate and money supply growth seem relatively constant over
the business cycle.
Finally, we test for an impact of changes in the communication strategy of the Fed
on consumers’ likelihood of forming consistent expectations. This is highly relevant, since
having a sound understanding of monetary policy increases the effectiveness of monetary
policy making. In an effort to improve the understanding of monetary policy and to guide
expectations of the public, central banks have, over the last two decades, established new
means of communication and transparency. To evaluate the success of these efforts, we
test to which extend the introduction of specific elements improved the understanding of
the public regarding monetary policy and helped them to form consistent expectations.
In order to analyse potential effects, we use the same set of macroeconomic determinants
used beforehand and amend this regression by the set of dummy variables representing
important milestones in the communication strategy of the Fed.15 Estimation results are
presented in Table 8.
As those milestones should influence the likelihood of being consistent with the Taylor
rule the most, we interpret these results first. We can report that the introduction of
the Beige book, the Announcement of the Federal Funds Target rate, the assessment of
Risk, the establishment of the press conference as well as the announcement of an ex-
plicit inflation target helped to increase the propensity of consumers to form consistent
expectations. Regarding the relative size of the effects, the announcement of the explicit
inflation target stands out followed by the introduction of the Beige book. Both events
may certainly be characterized as major steps in the communication policy of the Federal
Reserve. Moreover, given that the introduction of the explicit target has to be seen rel-
ative to the introduction of the means beforehand, this result is remarkable in terms of
size and significance. Furthermore, we can also observe that the publication of the voting
record did not help to improve the ability to form consistent expectations with respect
15Middeldorp (2011) also incorporates dummy variables to control for important milestones of commu-
nication.
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Table 8: Consistency and Central Bank Communication
Income Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Three
πt−1 -0.0008 0.0014 -0.0117*** 0.0037
(0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0026)
σ2π,t−1 -0.0031** 0.0032* 0.0008 0.0012
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0013)
oilt−1 0.0001** -0.0002** 0.0003*** -0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ut−1 0.0044*** 0.0216*** 0.0031* 0.0066***
(0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0023)
m2growtht−1 -0.0031*** 0.0066*** -0.0006 0.0017*
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0009)
funds ratet−1 0.0022 -0.0035** 0.0011 -0.0038***
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0014)
nber recessiont 0.0286*** -0.0964*** -0.1247*** -0.0384***
(0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0183) (0.0062)
BeigeBook83t -0.0392*** 0.0214 0.0699*** 0.0201*
(0.0131) (0.0178) (0.0211) (0.0114)
FFTargetAnnouncement94t -0.0061 0.0445*** 0.0239*** 0.0164**
(0.0072) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0070)
BalanceofRisk00t 0.0125 -0.0134 0.0288** -0.0026
(0.0098) (0.0139) (0.0114) (0.0118)
V otes02t 0.0214* -0.0051 -0.0327** 0.0117
(0.0116) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0112)
ForwardGuidance03t 0.0234** -0.0492*** 0.0115 -0.0137
(0.0103) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0103)
PressConference11t 0.0391*** -0.0851*** 0.0299* -0.0304***
(0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0163) (0.0114)
ExplicitTarget12t 0.1000*** 0.0916** 0.0957*** 0.0678
(0.0171) (0.0443) (0.0240) (0.0588)
N 93,763 95,893 95,389 93,109
χ2 826.6 946.8 794.3 356.4
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.832 -0.234 -0.380 -0.472
Wald test (ρ=0, χ2) 17.91 0.852 3.269 1.684
Notes: Table 8 reports the marginal partial effects from the heckprobit models evaluated at the represen-
tative consumer. The Wald test for ρ = 0 gives the χ2 statistics of the Wald test for independence from
the sample selection equation. Standard errors are calculated with the δ method (Oehlert 1992) and are
reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
to the Taylor rule. This might not be surprising as this basically reflects a dimension of
disagreement that may not help to steer expectations in a specific direction. Interestingly,
the introduction of forward guidance in 2003 does not lead to significantly more people
having consistent Taylor rule expectations relative to the other means introduced before-
hand. Given that this effect has to be seen relative to all other established measures up to
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this date, which especially regarding the balance of risk assessment have forward looking
elements in it, this should not be interpreted as having no effect.
Moreover, we also find effects of monetary policy communication on consistency with
the Income Fisher equation and the Phillips curve. Notably, they are much less clear
cut. However, there is one event that is important for consistency with all three economic
concepts: The announcement of an explicit inflation target in January 2012 helped to
improve the understanding of all three economic concepts. Additionally, the announce-
ment of changes in the Federal Funds target rate in February 1994 stands out as it had
a positive effect on consistency with the Phillips curve, the Taylor rule as well as con-
sistency with all three concepts simultaneously. Interestingly, both the introduction of
forward guidance and of the press conference improved consumers’ likelihood of correctly
distinguishing between real and nominal expected income. Analysing consistency with all
three relations simultaneously, we additionally find a relevant role for the introduction of
the Beige book and the establishment of the press conference.
4.3 Consistency and Forecast Accuracy
Do respondents that form theory-consistent expectations also form more accurate fore-
casts? Ang et al. (2007) show that professional forecasters in the SPF predict inflation
better than any other forecasting model or than expectations extracted from the bond
market. Several studies have further pointed out that household expectations are im-
portant from the perspective of monetary policy. We study the accuracy of quantitative
inflation expectations of consistent and non-consistent consumers and compare them to
the median forecast of the SPF. Thus, we evaluate if we can systematically extract in-
dividuals – not only based on demographic characteristics – that produce more accurate
inflation forecasts.
We start the analysis by plotting the average absolute forecast errors (AFEs) of theory-
consistent consumers relative to the AFEs of consumers with non-consistent expectations
in Figure 2, where summary statistics of the relative shares are given in Table 9. A
relative share below one means that theory-consistent consumers in a given period have
lower absolute forecast errors than non-consistent consumers, and vice versa. In most pe-
riods, consistent consumers produce lower AFEs with respect to inflation. An exception
is the period at the beginning of our sample where consumers that have theory-consistent
expectations perform worse than non-consistent consumers, especially in the case of con-
sistency with the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule. We have to bear in mind that those
respondents surveyed in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s experienced stagflation and non-
active monetary policy and that in most of these early periods neither the Phillips curve
relationship nor the Taylor rule held in reality as shown in Figure A.2 in the appendix. As
shown in Figure 1 in section 4.1, we also find a relatively lower share of consumers form-
ing consistent expectations during this period, which one would expect when consumers
23
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Note: Graphs show average absolute forecast errors of consistent consumers, relative to the forecast errors
of non-consistent consumers.
expect stagflation. With the appointment of Volcker as the FED chairman at the end of
1979, more consumers started to forecast in a theory-consistent way and their forecasts
became more accurate compared to consumers giving non-consistent forecasts.
Overall, respondents who correctly distinguish between nominal and real variables
produce forecasts that have on average 1% lower AFEs than non-consistent consumers.
While this difference is relatively small, respondents who form consistent expectations
with respect to the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve differ more in their forecast accu-
racy compared to the respective non-consistent samples. Regarding consistency with the
Phillips curve, consistent consumers have about 4% lower AFEs and in the case of con-
sistency with the Taylor rule about 9% lower AFEs. Consumers whose expectations are
consistent with all three principles have on average 7% lower AFEs than the non-consistent
consumers. Note that the improvement in forecast accuracy of consistent consumers is
even larger when we compare the median values. In Figure 2 we can also observe that
the variance is relatively high with the highest variance for consistency with all three
principles. Summary statistics are provided in Table 9.
Next, we evaluate the distance of the AFEs of consistent and non-consistent forecasts
to the AFEs of the SPF, shown in Figure 3 with summary statistics in Table 10. As the
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Table 9: AFEs of Consumers with Consistent Expectations Relative to AFEs with Non-
Consistent Expectations
Mean Median SD Min Max N
Income Fisher equation 0.99 0.98 0.12 0.71 1.43 392
Phillips curve 0.96 0.94 0.24 0.45 1.78 410
Taylor rule 0.91 0.90 0.14 0.60 1.62 410
All three 0.93 0.91 0.24 0.26 1.75 392
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Note: Black lines denote differences in AFEs of consistent consumers, red dotted lines denote differences
in AFEs of non-consistent consumers.
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Table 10: Distance of Consumers’ AFEs to the AFE of Professional Forecasters
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
Consistent Fisher 2.01 2.06 0.88 -0.44 5.06 392 0.28 31.74***
Non-Consistent Fisher 2.01 2.06 0.87 -0.05 5.46 410 – –
Consistent Phillips 1.94 1.89 1.09 -0.84 7.06 410 4.31*** 199.83***
Non-Consistent Phillips 2.05 2.11 0.92 -0.31 5.17 410 – –
Consistent Taylor rule 1.87 1.87 0.92 -0.15 7.08 410 21.01*** 207.78***
Non-Consistent Taylor rule 2.16 2.20 0.91 -0.41 5.45 410 – –
Consistent all three 1.81 1.74 1.17 -1.60 7.46 392 8.17*** 5.60**
Non-Consistent all three 2.02 2.06 0.86 -0.05 5.30 410 – –
Notes: The last two columns represent tests for equality of means (medians) between the subsamples of
consistent vs. non-consistent consumers for a particular relation. For the mean we employ a two-sample
mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and for the median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations
rank test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
difference approaches zero, consumers’ forecast accuracy regarding inflation approaches
that of the SPF. A positive difference means that consumers have higher AFEs than
professional forecasters, while a negative difference means that consumers beat the SPF
forecast on average. As one would expect, in most periods consumers’ AFEs are higher
than the SPF errors for both consistent and non-consistent consumers, where the overall
median AFE from the Michigan survey is 135% higher than the median AFE of the SPF.
As shown in Table 10, consumers with expectations consistent with the Income Fisher
equation produce AFEs that are 2.01 inflation points higher than those in the SPF, while
AFEs from forecasts consistent with the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule are 1.94 and
1.87 points higher, respectively. For comparison the average absolute forecasts error in
the SPF is 1.27 inflation points.
Nevertheless, there exist periods where consumers that form consistent forecasts out-
perform the SPF. These are most evident in the first half of the 1980s and in 2008; the
latter especially for consistency with all three principles. Moreover, consumers with con-
sistent expectations are consistently better able to match the SPF forecast accuracy than
their non-consistent counterparts. This is especially true in the later part of the sam-
ple period, after the Volcker disinflation and the beginning of an active monetary policy
regime in the U.S. As shown in Table 10, these differences are statistically significant
in almost all cases, meaning that consistency with economic concepts on average moves
consumers’ inflation forecasts closer to professionals’ estimates.
5 Conclusion
Expectations are of key relevance for macroeconomic outcomes. While many papers have
investigated the properties of expectations of individual series in depth, there is almost
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no evidence on whether expectations on several macroeconomic aggregates are formed
consistent with important economic concepts.
This paper addresses this research gap by calculating the share of people that form
consistent expectations regarding the Taylor rule, the Phillips curve and the Income Fisher
equation. In addition, we explore how this share of consistent consumers changes over
time and how it is affected both by macroeconomic variables and by the communication
policy of the Federal Reserve, and finally check if people benefit from having consistent
expectations in terms of reduced inflation forecast errors.
We find that 50% of the surveyed U.S. population form expectations in line with the
Taylor rule and the Income Fisher equation. Furthermore, 25% correctly infer the struc-
tural relationship of the Phillips curve. While this share is relatively time-invariant for
the Income Fisher equation, it seems to be more business-cycle-dependent for the Phillips
curve and the Taylor rule. When looking at the heterogeneity across socioeconomic char-
acteristics, we find some variation for all concepts considered.
In addition, we show that having consistent expectations is affected by a certain set
of macro determinants. In particular, higher inflation above 2% decreases the probabil-
ity of forming consistent expectations with respect to the Phillips curve and the Taylor
rule, while the effect is positive for consistency with the Income Fisher equation. Also,
during recessions people have problems forming consistent expectations with respect to
the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule. Moreover, consistency with respect to all macroe-
conomic concepts analysed was affected significantly by changes in the communication
strategy of the Federal Reserve. While we find that consistency with the Taylor rule is
most strongly positively affected by improvements in communication and transparency,
the likelihood of consistency with respect to all concepts was significantly improved by
the announcement of changes in its target for the federal funds rate in February 1994 and
the introduction of the official inflation target in January 2012. Finally, we can show that
having consistent expectations benefits consumers. Investigating their inflation forecast
accuracy, we report that consumers make better inflation forecasts and are closer to the
SPF forecast accuracy if they have consistent expectations.
This paper offers interesting insights regarding the formation process of expecta-
tions by consumers. By testing for the consistency of economic concepts instead of only
analysing the rationality of individual time series, we contribute to the literature. Fur-
thermore, the result that people benefit from having consistent expectations and at the
same time have problems with recession periods may call for policy actions. At the same
time, we can show that the already introduced measures of monetary policy communica-
tion have significantly positive effects on the likelihood of forming consistent expectations,
especially regarding the Taylor rule. Nevertheless, our results could give further reasons
for a clear communication by monetary and fiscal authorities especially during recession
periods and, thus, could give further motivation for the recently popular measures of
forward guidance. Additional benefit might be gained by targeting specific demographic
27
groups such as older, less educated and lower income groups as this could increase overall
economic literacy in the population.
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Note: Share philu (share taylu) gives the share of consumers consistent with the Phillips curve (Tay-
lor rule), where inflation expectations are defined from the qualitative question [A12] as discussed in
the paper. Share philu combined (share taylu combined) additionally use the answers to the quan-
titative question on expected inflation [A12b] and code inflation expectations as “increase”/“stay the
same”/“decrease” if the difference of quantitative expectations compared to last month’s actual inflation
rate, rounded to the nearest integer, points in the same direction as the answer to the qualitative inflation
question [A12]. Share philu consdiff (share taylu consdiff) conditions the answers to the qualitative
inflation question [A12] on the sign of the change in individual quantitative inflation expectations between
the first and the second interview in the rotating panel. Shaded areas denote recession periods as defined
by the NBER.
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Note: Shaded areas denote periods where the Phillips curve trade-off, using actual data rounded to the
nearest integer, was realised 12 months ahead, i.e. where future changes 12 months ahead of the Federal
Funds rate, the inflation rate, and the unemployment rate, rounded to the nearest integer, were in line
with a Taylor rule.
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Table A.1: Income Fisher equation: Explicit and Implicit Real Income Expectations
REAL INCOME UP/DOWN (NOMINAL INCOME-PRICES) NEXT YEAR
NEXT YEAR Up Same Down Total
Go up more than prices 41% 8% 5% 20%
31,392 1,963 4,340 37,695
Go up same as prices 43% 62% 37% 43%
33,191 14,909 31,364 79,464
Go up less than prices 16% 30% 58% 37%
11,836 7,325 48,396 67,557
Total 41% 13% 46% 100%
76,419 24,197 84,100 184,716
Notes: Number of respondents and column frequencies are reported. Consistent fractions
are marked in bold.
Table A.2: Phillips curve: Inflation and Unemployment Expectations
PRICES UP/DOWN UNEMPLOYMENT MORE/LESS NEXT YEAR
NEXT YEAR More About the same Less Total
Go up 76% 68% 62% 70%
63,554 76,427 23,125 163,106
Go up (at the same rate) 7% 12% 11% 10%
6,139 13,889 4,237 24,265
Stay the same 12% 17% 22% 16%
9,966 19,164 8,042 37,172
Go down 4% 3% 5% 4%
3,523 3,065 1,948 8,536
Total 36% 48% 16% 100%
83,182 112,545 37,352 233,079
Notes: Number of respondents and column frequencies are reported. Consistent fractions are
marked in bold.
Table A.3: Taylor rule: Interest rate and Inflation Expectations
INTEREST RATES UP/ PRICES UP/DOWN NEXT YEAR
DOWN NEXT YEAR Go up Go up (same rate) Same Go down Total
Go up 59% 43% 32% 24% 52%
94,885 10,342 11,822 1,979 119,028
Stay the same 27% 39% 42% 29% 31%
44,063 9,296 15,533 2,431 71,323
Go down 14% 18% 26% 48% 17%
22,349 4,427 9,370 4,007 40,153
Total 70% 10% 16% 4% 100%
161,297 24,065 36,725 8,417 230,504
Notes: Number of respondents and column frequencies are reported. Consistent fractions are marked in
bold and are conditional on consistent answers to the unemployment question.
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Table A.4: Taylor rule: Interest rate and Unemployment Expectations
INTEREST RATES UP/ UNEMPLOYMENT MORE/LESS NEXT YEAR
DOWN NEXT YEAR More Same Less Total
Go up 55% 51% 46% 52%
45,025 56,579 16,952 118,556
Stay the same 26% 34% 33% 31%
21,176 37,937 12,133 71,246
Go down 19% 15% 21% 17%
15,627 16,769 7,795 40,191
Total 36% 48% 16% 100%
81,828 111,285 36,880 229,993
Notes: Number of respondents and column frequencies are reported. Consistent fractions are
marked in bold and are conditional on consistent answers to the inflation question.
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